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The main consistent conclusions of the empirical literature about the effects of minimum 
wages are threefold. First, there exists evidence about the negative employment effects of 
minimum wages, notably for the least-skilled groups. Secondly, after an increase in 
minimum wage, the probability that a teenager leaves school also increases. And, thirdly, 
the minimum wage affects not only the earnings of workers on minimum wage, but also of 
other workers with higher wages. In this paper we present an adverse selection model that 
deals with all these aspects. In this model, costly education serves as a signal of the 
worker’s ability, which, initially, is private information. The firms in this model make 
competitive offers to workers after observing if they are or not educated, but retain the 
option to fire them when their true ability is revealed. Under this model setting, after the 
establishment of a minimum wage, an adverse selection problem emerges and no low 
skilled worker is hired. We show how a situation of equilibrium could be re-established 
through changes in the firing and educational costs that reinforce the signalling mechanism. 
These changes, however, do not alter, qualitatively, the main conclusions about the effects 
of minimum wage, since the negative effect on low skilled unemployment, on the spill-over 
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Since the seminal work of Spence (1973) non compulsory education can be viewed, both, 
as a way used by workers to signal their quality to firms, and as a way used by firms to 
discriminate ex-ante the productivity of workers. This mechanism is particularly relevant 
for some collectives, like teenagers, with no significant professional experience, nor any 
other observable reputational reference about their abilities.  
 
For workers, the incentive for gaining education relies on a higher expected wage rate for 
“good” workers when quality is a priori unobservable. In a separating equilibrium
1, low 
ability workers choose not to get educated (low skilled workers) and their expected wage 
should accordingly be lower than for educated workers (skilled workers) because their 
lower expected productivity. In equilibrium, firms are able to adjust the wage paid to 
workers’ expected productivity once education is observed.  
 
In this setting, the existence of a minimum wage that provides universal coverage would 
distort this mechanism in two ways. On the one hand, it discourages workers with 
intermediate abilities from getting education since, in terms of differential of wages, the 
gains of costly education are lower. On the other hand, firms will be reluctant to hire low 
skilled workers if they have to pay a wage higher than their productivity. The establishment 
of a minimum wage, therefore, undermines this signalling mechanism. If the signalling 
mechanism fails, firms will not hire low skilled workers because their expected productivity 
will be lower than the minimum wage; they will, however, continue to offer jobs to workers 
with education and, as it is showed below, at a higher wage rate. This “spill-over” effect on 
the wages of skilled workers results from the discouraging effect that the establishment of a 
minimum wage has on the education of intermediate ability workers, which makes only 
higher ability workers to choose getting education.  
 
These features deal with some of the empirical findings highlighted by several authors. A 
relatively consistent conclusion of a majority of studies about the effects of minimum 
wages, as Neumark and Wascher (2007) points out in their survey, is the negative 
employment effects of minimum wages. Moreover, there exists relatively overwhelming 
evidence of stronger disemployment effects for the least-skilled groups. Neumark and 
Wascher (1995b ,1996b ,2003) also found that a higher minimum wage leads to a 
significant decline in the proportion of teenagers who are both in school and employed and 
a significant increase in the proportion of teenagers who are neither in school nor 
employed. These results are consistent with a higher minimum wage causing firms to 
substitute away from lower-skilled teenagers towards higher-skilled teenagers, with the 
resulting increase in the relative wages of higher-skilled teenagers. Consistent with this 
hypotheses, Neumark and Wascher (1995b and 1996b), and Turner and Demiralp (2001) 
                                                 
1 Following Mas-Colell et al.- (1995),  In a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium (p.453-454): 
  Each worker type receives a wage equal to her productivity level. 
  Low ability workers choose to get no education. 
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found that a higher minimum wage increases the probability of a teenager leaving school, 
presumably to look for a job or to work. 
 
In relation to the “spill-over” effect of minimum wages, Lee (1999), DiNardo, Fortin and 
Lemieux (1996), Green and Paarsch (1996), and Neumark, Schweitzer and Wascher (2004), 
among others, find that the minimum wage affects not only the earnings of workers on the 
minimum wage, but also of other workers with higher wages. This “spill over” effect was 
mainly associated with a substitution effect among low skilled labour and high skilled 
labour, or based on efficiency arguments, as Grossman (1983) points out. By increasing the 
relative price of low skilled labour, minimum wages may lead to an increased demand for 
more skilled workers, since a minimum wage increases the relative price of low skilled 
labour. This explanation partially collides with the discouraging effect on education, since 
high wages for skilled workers should act as an incentive to increase the education level. In 
this paper, we provide an alternative justification based in the role of education on job 
signalling that overcome this limitation. 
 
In the model presented in this paper, workers differ in their innate abilities, which are 
distributed randomly in a known interval. These abilities affect the productivity of workers 
and the probability of completing the education process. Given the relation between ability 
and educational success, education serves to firms as a signal of workers ability.  Firms, 
which offer jobs for two periods, confront an adverse selection problem since ability is 
initially unobservable. The true ability is only revealed in the second period, and firms have 
then the option to fire workers if, by doing so, the benefits (saving wage costs) exceed the 
firing costs. Exploiting the signalling value of education, firms can classify workers by their 
level of education, reaching a better match between the wage and the expected workers 
productivity.  
 
In equilibrium, only those workers with abilities higher than the equilibrium ability 
threshold get education, with low-skilled/low-ability workers and skilled/high-ability 
workers co-existing in the market. Simultaneously, firms will offer distinct wages to skilled 
and non-skilled workers, which also serve as incentives to workers while deciding about 
their optimal level of education. In equilibrium, these wages have to be coherent with the 
ability threshold, while the ability threshold has, in turn, to be coherent with wages offered 
by firms.  
 
Having exposed the main features of the model, we proceed now to analyze the effects of 
minimum wages on the equilibrium and explore two different ways to modify the 
equilibrium of the signalling mechanism after the establishment of a minimum wage, 
without having such dramatic effects on the employment of low skilled workers. The first 
of them is the reduction of firing costs. As mentioned before, the model analyzed 
incorporates endogenous separating decisions which allow firms to fire workers if their 
productivity is low enough to compensate firing costs. Lowering firing costs discourages 
low ability workers from getting education and, therefore, reinforces the role of education 
as a signal. The second way is increasing the cost (implicit and explicit) of getting education 
for workers. As higher educational levels have higher cost, it is more likely that only high 
ability workers will get higher education. Hence, higher education costs also reinforce the 
value of education as a signal. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model, discussing their main 
features and determining the equilibrium and their properties. In section 3 we analyze the 
effect of the minimum wage on the equilibrium. In this section we find that minimum    
 4 
wages will push more workers to choose not to get education, and show how firms will 
react to minimum wages by not hiring low skilled workers and increasing the wages of 
skilled workers. In section 4 we discuss how managing the firing and educational costs 
could help to reduce the negative effects on the employment of least-skilled workers. 
Finally, the main conclusions are summarised in section 5. 
 
2.- Model.  
 
In this paper we present an adverse selection model with signalling education where firms 
offer job positions for two periods, but retain the option to fire workers when their true 
ability is revealed. In the first period the workers ability () is private information, but it is 
revealed in the second period.  
 
In the model presented, education serves as a signal of the worker’s ability. Workers can 
choose to get costly education, but they successfully end their education with a probability 
that depends on their abilities. All the rest of relevant parameters (firing cost, firm 
productivity, wages, probability distribution function of skills, costs of education and 





Workers differ in their innate ability level, which is assumed to be randomly (for simplicity, 
uniformly) distributed in the interval    , . Workers, as depicted in Figure 1, can choose 
to get instantaneously education at a cost given by C, which is the same for all agents, but 
the success of the educational decision is random, with a probability that depends on their 
level of ability. For the sake of simplicity, the following assumptions are imposed: agents 
are assumed to be risk neutrals, future is discounted at a constant rate given by , there is 
not saving decision, utility is linear in consumption
2, and the probability of educational 
success, P(), is assumed to be linear in  
3. We also assume that the reservation utility is 
zero (or lower than the lowest possible wage offered by firms), so any job offer would be 
accepted by workers. 
 
At the beginning of the first period, workers receive job offers which are characterized by a 
wage rate, 
HS w  if she has chosen to get more educated, and 
LS w if not. All the job offers 
last for two periods, but the worker could only be fired in the second period. In that case, 
worker receives a compensation F, which is precisely the firing cost for the firm, and is 
fixed exogenously. Given the assumptions on information about , for each pair of wages 
HS w , 





                                                 
2 More concisely,  c ) c ( U  , where c is the agent consumption level. 
3 If Ps is the probability of educational success, P( )=0, and P( )=1, with  




Figure 1.- Sequence of events. Workers 
Job offer
T=1







Wage rate per period W
If she chooses get educated




In this model, workers choose to get more educated if the difference in earnings 
compensates the costs of education corrected by the probability of education success. Since 
the total difference in earnings depends on the difference in wage rates and on the event 
“get fired” in each educational status, three alternative conditions can emerge depending on 
the worker ability level , , 
 
  Agent is not fired in any case.  
     
LS LS LS LS HS HS w w C w w P P w w             )) ( 1 ( ) ( , or,
   
LS HS w w
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  Agent gets fired in both cases (if she choose/don’t choose get more educated), 
      F w C F w P P F w
LS LS HS             )) ( 1 ( ) ( , or,






  Agent is only fired if she choose to get more educated,  
     
LS LS LS LS HS w w C w w P P F w             )) ( 1 ( ) ( , or, 
  F w w w
) ( P
C LS LS HS     

, 
which also satisfies the condition,   ) ( w F w
LS HS      1  which implies that, 
despite the event “get fired”, the income of the agent is higher when she decides to 
increase her education than when se decides not to get any education. 
 
Denoting by  HS
F P as an indicator of the event “get fired” if the agent choose to get more 
education, and  HS
F P as an indicator of the event “get fired” if not, we can then 
reformulate the previous conditions altogether as, 
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Only if  0 ) , , , , , (  F k w w C E
LS HS  , a worker with ability  chooses to get more educated. 
It must be noted that  HS
F P  and  LS
F P  are both functions of the worker’s ability, , and 
that, since the quality of worker is private information, whereas wages are public, in the 
first period only workers know if they will be fired next period given the wage rates and the 
firing cost. Condition [1] can be depicted graphically for given values of 
LS HS w w , as it is 
illustrated in Figure 2. The situation represented in the graphs illustrates the potential effect 
of “firing event” in the education decision.  
 
Abstracting from the effect on the discontinuity points
4, the effect of an increase in wages 
on education decision depends not only on 
HS w and 
LS w , but also on the size of the 
relative increase of 
HS w and 
LS w , due to the opposite signs of their partial derivatives off 
of the discontinuity points:  
  0







F k w w C E 
, 0











Fig. 2.- Education decision: Effect of firing 
 
              
max min
Firing threshold for LS Firing threshold for HS
  *) ( *) ( ) 1 (   




*) ( *) (  
LS HS w w 
  F w w w
LS LS HS    *) ( *) ( *) (    
a) Only high ability workers gets education
*
 
                                                 
4 Increasing 
HS w and 
LS w , also increases the skill threshold associated to the “firing” event,  moving to the 
right the discontinuity points.    
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Fig. 2.- Education decision: Effect of firing (cont.) 
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For workers, education allows them to increase their utility; thus, the decision to get 
educated involves a cost-benefit analysis. As explained before, workers increase their 
educational level if the difference in earnings, bearing in mind the eventual “get fired” 
event, compensates the costs of education corrected by the probability of education 
success.  For given wage values 
LS HS w , w , with 
LS HS w w  ,a worker who knows her 
own ability level is able to elucidate if she will get fired and, thus, evaluate the convenience    
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of getting education. We assume
5, lemma 1, that a separating equilibrium exists for every 
pair 
LS HS w , w , with 










    and    
LS HS w w
P
C




 for >’ belonging to the interval
6 









Given F ,k, C, P() and , for values 
LS HS w , w , with 
LS HS w w  ,  k w
HS   0 ; 
 k w
LS   0 , satisfying:  
a) 









   ,  
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then there exists an ability level *,       * , which determines that workers with  * choose not 







Given F, k,C, P() and , for  W w w
LS HS  ,
7 and *    R,       * , there exists a 
function f : W -> that univocally assigns  *   to 
LS HS w w , ;    *  =f(
LS HS w w , ). 
 
This result allows to assign a unique ability threshold  *  ,  once the menu 
wage W w w
LS HS  , , is known . This information is used by firms for updating their beliefs, 





Competitive firms offer job positions which last for two periods. Hiring a worker with 
ability given by  has a return of k, where k is an exogenous productivity factor linked to 
                                                 
5 In fact, this assumption implies that workers who know that they will get fired in any case do not have 









    .  
6 Obviously if  ) )( 1 (
) (
LS HS w w
P
C
   






 nobody gets more education.  
 
7 W is the set of values of wages satisfying the assumptions specified in lemma 1.     
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other variables like capital per worker ratio, technology incorporated to production 
process, etc. 
 In the first period (see fig 3),  is worker’s private information but it is revealed in period 
2. As explained before,  is random with support in the interval     ,  and follows a 
known distribution probability function given by H() (with probability density function 
dH()=h() ) . In period 2, if the condition 
k
F w 
  is satisfied, the worker gets fired, 
being w the wage rate and F the firing costs.  For the sake of simplicity, we assume that 
both workers and firms are discounting the future at the same rate give by . 
 
 











Wage rate per period W
If she chooses get educated




The expected profit for a given job position,  ) k , F , w , ( V  , when there is no education 
signal, is given by 
 
   F w k w k E k F w V      , max ) , , , (               [2.] 
 
Or, by the law of iterated expectation,  
   







FdH dH w k w kE k F w V


       ) , , , ( ,     [3.] 
In a competitive setting, firms offer wages that make their expected profit equal to zero. 
Thus, the competitive wage, w*, is the wage that makes expression [3] equal to zero, so w* 
is the solution of the implicit equation  0 ) , *, , (  k F w V  , given by, 
   













        ;    [4.]    
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If no workers get fired the equation [4] has the typical competitive solution
8,     kE w  * . 
Given this result, for values of F satisfying         E k F , no worker gets fired, since in 










F w ] [ ] [ *
.   
Denoting by Fmax the value of firing costs accomplishing the condition,       E k Fmax , 
then, for any 0<F< Fmax , we have     kE w  * . In particular when F attains its minimum 
value
9, F = 0, and H(θ) is uniformly distributed in    , , we obtain the following second 
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* * *  
 
 
   

 
For  1 , 0     , this expression gives the following feasible solution 
] [ ) 2 2 ( *  E k w    .  
 
This result illustrates the positive effect on competitive wages of firing costs since, when 
0<F< Fmax , the wage paid by firms is higher than the unconditional expected productivity 
of workers. As a counterpart, low ability workers would expect to get fired in the second 
period and, therefore, unemployment could emerge in this model.  
 
2.3.- The role of education. 
 
 
From a firm’s point of view, education is a pure signal since the worker productivity is 
unaffected by education. For firms, the only advantage of education is their informational 
value about the worker’s ability, since education is observable and the skills are not.  From 
lemma 1, once the firm observes the educational level, the worker probability type is 
updated from Bayes rule in the following way.  
 












 E P  
*) ( 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
*
   

      H h h E P E P
E
, 
and by Bayes rule  
                                                 
8 When no worker gets fired, equation [4] can be simplified to, 
   * ) 1 ( * * w kE dH w k kE w       


       ; 
where     kE w  * . 








E k F , but this condition implies negative firing costs. 















) ( ) (
) ( ) (













;     [5.] 











*) ( ) (
* 0






H H G ;    [6.] 
 
 












) ( ) (
) ( ) (


































B ;  [8.] 
 
 
With education as pure signal, the expected profit for firm is given by 
 













FdG dG w ' k w * kE *) , k , F , w , ( V
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
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;     [9.] 
 
  Workers with no education, 
   


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FdB dB w k w * kE *) , k , F , w , ( V


          ;  
[10.] 
And the competitive wages, 
HS * w ; 
LS * w , accomplishing
10 
LS HS * w * w  ; 
 k w
HS  
* 0 , and  * * 0  k w
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2,  there exists a function  g  :  -> W’ , given by eqs. [11] and  [12],  that univocally assigns 
LS HS w w
* * , to each * ;    *) ( ,
* *  g w w
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From the implicit function theorem
12, it is possible to elucidate the effect on the 




*) ( 1 )
*
( 1
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;  [14.] 
 
From equations [13] and [14] it is clear that the effect of an increase in the education 
threshold skill * is an increase of both wages, 
HS * w and 
LS * w , but the  effect on the 
relative increase remains unclear. For example, if  is uniformly distributed in [0, 1] and no 











LS HS w w
 is satisfied, so both wages increase at the 
same rate and the wage differential remains constant.  
 
 
2.4.- Ability threshold in equilibrium. 
 
Once exposed the main features of the model, we define the equilibrium in the following 
fashion. 
                                                 
11 W is satisfying,   k w
HS   0 ,  k w
LS   0 , and 
HS LS w w  . 
12  0   *) , w ( V *) , k , F , w , ( V    ,  differentiating totally and operating  
*) , w ( V








    ;      
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In the model exposed, given P(), H() C, β, k and F, a separating competitive Bayesian 
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eq w* ,by lemma 1 only workers with skills higher than *eq 
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    0
) (
) 1 ( * ) 1 ( * * * *
) , , * , * , , (







P P F w P w w w w




















This equilibrium will be designated as complete equilibrium, in contraposition to 
incomplete equilibrium defined later. The difference relies in the existence of low skilled 
competitive offers by firms (complete equilibrium), or not (incomplete equilibrium). 
 
Complete equilibrium can be viewed as a Nash equilibrium where simultaneously firms 




eq w* , given the signal education, eq*, and workers with 




eq w* . A 
feasible equilibrium is depicted graphically in fig 4. 
 
By lemma 2 each possible value of educational signal, ’  in     ,  determines a pair 
) ' ( * 
HS w , ) ' ( * 
LS w =g(’). In addition, by corollary of lemma 1, each pair of wages 
determines a value of  *  =f( ) ' ( * 
HS w , ) ' ( * 
LS w ), that satisfies for  *    , 
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F LS HS LS HS
LS HS
; 
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Thus, a composite function like, *  =f(g(’)), exists. The complete equilibrium implies 
that * '    , therefore, in mathematical terms, eq* can be viewed as the fixed point of 
the composite function,   =f(g()), being f(g()) a function that maps *    R  ,{ *  
R;       * } into itself. Assuming continuity of f(g()), we can apply Brouwer’s fixed 
point theorem to ensure that, at least, one fixed point exists and, therefore, the equilibrium 
exists, but could not be unique.    
 
A more formal proof on the unicitiy of the equilibrium is avoided, but it could be deducted 
from applying the contraction map theorem, first demonstrating that the operator f(g()) 
satisfies the Blackwell’s sufficiency theorem. This step will be avoided but to obtain the 
equilibrium we simulate numerically the model assuming that Blackwell’s conditions hold 
and that the Contraction mapping theorem could be applied. The strategy followed to 
reach the equilibrium is similar to the value function iteration method used to find a 
solution in dynamical optimization problems. We start with an initial guess 
0  and we 
obtain the wages values, ) ( *
0 
HS w , ) ( *
0 
LS w  by equations [11] and [12]. With these 
values we deduct from lemma 1 the value of skills,
1,  that satisfies 
0 ) , ), ( * ), ( * , , (
0 0 1  F k w w C E
LS HS    . With these steps we have obtained a first value of the 
composed function, 
1= f(g(
0)).  If 
1=  
0, then the fixed point is reached, if not, we 
simulate another time, replacing 
0 by 
1, and repeating the process until a fixed point is 
located. If f(g()) is a contraction, reaching to a solution is guaranteed by the contraction map 
theorem. Changing the initial guess value 
0, allow us to discard by numerical methods the 
existence of any other fixed point. 
 
To confirm the unicity of equilibrium, an alternative graphical analysis is used to validate 
the method employed and described before. This graphical deduction (see Fig. 5) of the 
equilibrium requires to consider a two dimensional plane with dimension (
1,
0), in which 
the function, 
1= f(g(
0)),  is depicted graphically for several values  of      ,
0  .   To 
determine the equilibrium, the condition 
1=
0 is added to the graph. The fixed point, eq*, 
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Fig. 4.- Feasible complete equilibrium simulated numerically 
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min max

LS HS w w ) (    1 ) ( P
C
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LS LS HS    
*
 
Note: The simulation of the equilibrium presented in this graph was obtained assuming that  is uniformly 
distributed in [0 1], with F=1, C=1,=1,k=5, and P()=. 
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LS HS   
 
 
Note: The simulation of the equilibrium presented in this graph was obtained assuming that  is uniformly 









Fig. 5.- Absence of equilibrium by violation of lemma 1  
(right graph: upper view) 
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Note: The simulation in this graph was obtained assuming that  is uniformly distributed in [0 1], with F=0.1, 
C=1,=1,k=5, and P()=. The absence of equilibrium is derived from, in this case, the violation of the 













  is not accomplished. 
 
Fig. 6.- Absence of equilibrium: non interior solution (all workers get education).  
(right graph: upper view) 
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Note: The simulation in this graph was obtained assuming that  is uniformly distributed in [0 1], with F=0.1, 
C=2.1,=1,k=5, and P()=.  
 
 
For a given equilibrium, the number of unemployed workers in the second period will be 

















*    (educated 

















  . 
 
3.- Effects of a minimum wage. 
 
Imposing a minimum wage restricts the ability of firms to manage freely their wage menu, 
disturbing the signalling mechanism and making the equilibrium unreachable. To 
understand the effect of such legislation in the model exposed, suppose that a minimum 
wage is imposed. In that case, the initial equilibrium in unfeasible since, from eq. 14, firms 
will only offer a wage like 
LS
eq w w * min   if the education threshold is higher than the value 
in the initial equilibrium, eq*. The unicity of equilibrium is critical in this case, since it 
implies that imposing a minimum wage, 
LS
eq w w * min  , determines the absence of a 
complete equilibrium in the sense defined previously. 
  





’( w m i n )
*(’(wmin))
*(’(wmin)) < ’( w m i n )  
Note: The simulation of the equilibrium presented in this graph was obtained assuming that  is uniformly 





Let ’ (wmin)  be the ability threshold (see Fig. 7) that makes firms to pay a competitive wage 
to non educated workers equal to w min = ) ' ( * 
LS w . The wage differential, 
) ' ( * ) ' ( *  
LS HS w w   between skilled and not skilled workers for ’(wmin)  creates an 
incentive to workers with ability higher than * to increase their education. But when *    
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<’ (wmin), the wage differential for ’(wmin) and the skill threshold * are not compatible.  
Firms are not able to offer any pair, 
LS HS w w * , * , of competitive wages that make the 
incentive compatible with the education signal. The only feasible equilibrium implies that 
firms will only offer jobs to educated workers, but workers decide about their education 
bearing in mind the minimum wage (despite the fact that there are no firms that offer such 
type of job) and the wage paid to educated workers.  
 





eq w* , for which, by lemma 1, only workers with skills higher than; 
) , * ( min
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If we denote by  *eq, the ability threshold in equilibrium in absence of the minimum wage, 
and by 
wmin
eq the ability threshold in equilibrium with a minimum wage, 
min w > *) ( * eq
LS
eq w  , it can then be concluded that 
wmin
eq>*eq .  
 
To see it, starting from the initial equilibrium *eq, the establishment of a minimum wage, 
from lemma 1, reduces the workers’ incentive
13 to increase their level of education, 
                                                 
13 Derivation of the implicit equation off the discontinuity points of 
    0
*) (
) 1 ( * ) 1 ( * * * *
) , , * , * *, , (
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since min *) ( * *) ( * *) ( * w w w w
HS LS HS       , and, in consequence, more workers will 
choose not to get any education. As * increases, the wages for educated workers become 
higher, which incentivizes workers to get more education, but this effect is weaker and, in 




Therefore, these results suggest that the employment effects of the minimum wage fall 
largely on the low-ability/low-skilled workers, because firms will be reluctant to offer jobs 
to workers with no education. But, at the other end, the wage of educated workers will 
become higher since their expected productivity increases. The model also shows that a 
minimum wage reduces the proportion of workers who choose to get education, because 
the incentive to do so, in terms of differential of wages, is lower after the minimum wage is 
imposed. 
 

















eq   
 
Note: The simulation of the equilibrium presented in this graph was obtained assuming that  is uniformly 




3.- The effect of firing, and education costs on signalling mechanism. 
 
 
From Fig. 7, it is clear that, starting for a given equilibrium, to reach a new one compatible 
with the minimum wage requires that the function, = f(g()), shifts enough to the right to 
intersect the 45º line ( = )  over the equilibrium value of ability *eq’, 
accomplishing, min ) *' ( ' * w w eq
LS
eq   .  
 
The new complete equilibrium must be reached in a new signalling mechanism that, by 
lemma 1, assigns higher values to the ability threshold, *, for every pair of competitive 
wages,   ) ' ( * ), ' ( *  
LS HS w w , being ’, any of the possible values of the ability threshold. 
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To put it into words, the changes in the signalling mechanism should discourage the 
intermediate ability workers from acquiring the signal (education), increasing the expected 
productivity of both low skilled and skilled workers. This behaviour is depicted graphically 
as a displacement of the function = f(g()), to the right 
    
Such displacement, as it will be showed in this section, can be induced by increasing 
education cost, C, or by lowering firing costs, F, because these changes will assign for each 
’ a higher value of ’*=f(g(’)) than before. These changes in C or F could be the result of 
firms’ decisions and do not necessarily imply any type of political or institutional decisions. 
This is obvious in the case of education, since there exist many different educational levels, 
different educative institutions, private or public, etc., and firms can vary their preferences 
among them in function of their signalling value. In the case of firing costs, it is usual for 
firms to have at their disposal a large variety of contractual forms, with different firing cost, 
that they can use when planning to hire workers. In this case, firms can rationally use the 
menu of contracts and firing costs as complementary signals about the workers ability.  
 
Both changes reinforce the signalling mechanism in the sense that, as result, firms are able 
to discriminate between high and low ability workers in a way that is coherent with the 
minimum wage and their discouraging effects on education.  
 
Nevertheless, the negative effect of the minimum wage on the employment of low 
ability/low skilled workers persists, but in a much more attenuated way. In relation to the 
education decision, as it will be showed, the fraction of workers that chooses no education 
(the equilibrium ability threshold) increases enough to attain the level compatible with the 
minimum wage,  min ) *' ( ' * w w eq
LS
eq   . In conclusion, in a complete equilibrium the increase 
on the unemployment of low ability/low skilled workers and the discouraging effect on 
education will persist after the establishment of a minimum wage. The increase in the 
unemployment will be lower with respect to the incomplete equilibrium, in detriment to 




3.1- Education cost. 
 
In relation to the effect of an increase in the cost of education, if we look to the 
equilibrium condition  
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So, the increase in education cost raises the level of ability in equilibrium.  








 is not defined, but looking at the Figure 2 it will become clear that in this 
case the cost of education could increase in the range, 
       
LS HS LS LS HS w w F w w w * * ) 1 ( , * * *        , with no effects on the ability level of 
equilibrium. In the opposite case, if the increase of education cost is higher, it will cause an 
increase in the equilibrium level of workers ability,  * eq  . 
   
These results provide us with valuable insights about a source of inefficiencies derived 
from the establishment of a minimum wage that are not well documented in the current 
literature. Let us suppose that in a model setting similar to the previously analyzed there 
exist in the economy n educational signals for which a complete equilibrium exists. Each of 
them is characterized by the same probability of educational success, P(), but they differ in 
their cost, denoted by C
(1<C
(2<…,<C
(n. From a social point of view, if the signals do not 
have any difference in terms of information about the abilities of workers, only the signal 
with the lowest cost, say C
(1 ,will be available. When a minimum wage is imposed, the 
“value” of the signal C
(1 is eroded
14, but other signal for which there exists a complete 
equilibrium, in spite of their higher cost
15, say C
(j , would become more valuable. Under this 
view, a minimum wage will generate inefficiencies since it will be necessary to move to 
another, more expensive, signal to get to a complete equilibrium. Another source of 
inefficiency, in this case extensively analyzed in the literature, is the employment effect of 
minimum wages for low skilled workers. In the model presented here, this effect comes 
from the displacement of firing thresholds to the right in the range of abilities, which 
translates into increases in the proportion of workers who have no job in the second 
period. 
 
In Figure 10, we simulate the effects of an increase in the cost of the educational signal, 
coherent with the effects of an increase in the minimum wage in the line of the arguments 
developed above. As it can be seen, the workers’ ability level in equilibrium increases and, 
therefore, the wages in equilibrium for educated (spill over effect) and non educated 
workers (to reach the minimum wage level) are increased too.  
 
Another effect, as mentioned before, is the displacement of firing thresholds to the right, 
which is translated into a higher fraction of workers unemployed in the second period. In 
the simulation presented, all the unemployed workers will be of low ability type, so the 
asymmetric effects of the minimum wage on the employment of low and high skilled 
workers persist, but much more attenuated than in the incomplete equilibrium. As   * eq   
increases, the wage for both types of workers (low and high skilled) increases, and, 






                                                 
14 The equilibrium will become incomplete. 
15 C(j is the cost of the signal with the lowest cost of all signals for which there exist a complete equilibrium.    
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Figure 10.- Effects of increases in the education cost 
 
Left: Base scenario (C=1)                       Right: Alternative scenario (C’=3.4)  
 





































Note: The simulation of the equilibrium presented in these graphs was obtained assuming that  is uniformly 
distributed in [0 1], with F=.5, =1,k=5, and P()=. 
 
3.2.- Firing costs. 
 
From the worker’s point of view, the higher firing costs, the lower the risk of being fired. 
Therefore, a reduction of that cost discourages workers from increasing their level of 
education. If we look again into the equilibrium condition, for  * eq    , 
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Abstracting from the effect on wages, the firing cost affects on the incentive to get 
educated when the worker is fired in the second period, and on the discontinuity points at    
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the “get fired” thresholds. Given the wages,
HS w and 
LS w , lower firing cost moves to the 








  , and reduces the 






   *  
 
For firms, the firing cost affects the competitive wage offered to educated and non 
educated workers, more especifically, higher firing cost lowers the competitive wages 
offered by firms. This assertion becomes clear when we differentiate the implicit functions, 
0 *) , , *, , (    k F w V
HS ,  0 *) , , *, , (    k F w V
LS , and assume that equilibrium workers’ 
































































;  [16.] 
 














   are the probabilities that educated workers 
and non educated workers, respectively, will get fired, the magnitude of the derivatives will 
be ranged in [-, 0].   













   , then after a change in firing cost the 













    
when firing cost increases the differential will be reduced, conversely, if   













   , after an increase in firing cost that differential 
will be increased.  
 
In sum, lower firing cost, on the one hand, increases the risk of being fired for intermediate 
ability workers discouraging them from getting more education and, on the other, changes 
the wage incentive which, in function of their sign and magnitude, can induce workers to 
increase their education.  
 
To elucidate the final effect, we investigate the effects of varying the firing cost in the 
equilibrium condition given by lemma 1,  0 ) , ), ' ( * ), ' ( * *, , (  F k w w C E
LS HS    . With 
this analysis, we aim to explore the effect on the workers ability, θ* decided by workers, 
given a menu of wages offered by firms for an education threshold, θ’, denoted by 
) ' ( * ), ' ( *  
LS HS w w . If the condition,  0 ) , ), ' ( * ), ' ( * *, , (  F k w w C E
LS HS    , moves    
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to the right
16 when the firing cost is reduced, see Figure 11, the  final effect of dropping 
firing cost will be an increase in the ability threshold of equilibrium, θ*eq. To do that, it 
suffices to analyze the sign of the derivative 
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) , ), ' ( * ), ' ( * *, , ( *
* F k w w C E















Fig. 11.- Changes in  0 ) , ), ' ( * ), ' ( * *, , (  F k w w C E
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Assuming infinitesimal changes in F and that the equilibrium,  θ*,  is attained off the 
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16 In words, for any  ) ' ( * ), ' ( *  
LS HS w w , the ability threshold for workers (lemma 1) in equilibrium  
is higher than before the reduction in firing cost.    
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*    vary between 
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 , it 








G  , and, thus, the derivative numerator vary 
between 0 and . Given that the denominator derivative is always positive, we can 







, and, therefore, when firing cost decreases the condition 
0 ) , ), ' ( * ), ' ( * *, , (  F k w w C E
LS HS     moves to the right, which ensures that the new 
equilibrium will be attained for higher values of worker’s ability threshold.  
 
In sum, the new complete equilibrium will be characterized by a lower fraction of workers 
who choose to get more educated, and a higher portion
17 of low skilled /low ability 







   . Once 
again, as   * eq   increases, it is possible to conclude that a spill-over effect on wages will be 
observed due to the wage increase for both types of workers (low and high skilled). 
  
 In Fig 12 we present a simulation example of the effect of a reduction in the firing cost, 





















                                                 
17 The effect on unemployment for the high skilled workers is unclear, since to elucidate it, first it is 
necessary to determine the change in  * eq   driven by the reduction on firing cost.    
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Fig. 12.- Effects of a reduction in firing cost 
 
Left: Base scenario (F=1)                       Right: Alternative scenario (F’=0.7)  



































Note: The simulation of the equilibrium presented in these graphs was obtained assuming that  is uniformly 
distributed in [0 1], with C=1, =1,k=5, and P()=.  In the bottom graph is depicted the displacement in 
0 ) , ), ' ( * ), ' ( * *, , (  F k w w C E
LS HS    driven by the firing costs reduction, 
 
 




Signalling is a main concern for workers who face their first entry in the labour market or 
find themselves at the first stages of their labour life. When signals are available to firms, 
they use them to discriminate ex ante the worker’s expected productivity, offering distinct 
wages in function of the existence or not of the signal, since the signal acts like a border 
between high productive workers and less productive workers. These differences in wages 
are used by workers to decide whether to get or not education. A binding minimum wage, 
that is, a minimum wage higher than the wage of the less productive workers, distorts this 
mechanism in a critical way, since the equilibrium becomes an adverse selection problem 
for the less skilled workers. 
 
In this paper, we present an adverse selection model with signalling education where firms 
offer job positions for two periods, but retain the option to fire workers when their true 
ability is revealed. In the first period, the workers ability is private information, but it is 
revealed in the second period. In this context, education serves as a signal of the worker’s 
ability, and they can choose to get costly education that is successfully completed with a 
probability that depends on the worker’s ability.  
 
After characterizing the equilibrium, we analyze the effects of the establishment of a 
binding minimum wage. Our results lead to the conclusion that the main effects of a 
binding minimum wage are threefold. We can observe, first, an increase in low skilled 
unemployment, secondly, a discouraging effect on education and, finally, the emergence of 
a spill-over effect in wages, since the wage for both types of workers (low skilled and high 
skilled) increases. These predicted effects are in line with the main (relatively consistent) 
conclusions of the empirical research about the effects of minimum wages.  
 
In the last section we have explored how the adverse selection problem can be avoided by 
changes in education and firing costs. Although these changes do not alter the predicted 
effects in qualitative terms, our results highlight an attenuation of the increase in 
unemployment for low skilled workers in detriment of the education decision. In other 
words, these results show that, after the establishment of a minimum wage, it is possible to 
attain lower rates of low skilled unemployment, while increasing at the same time the 
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A.1.- Proof of lemma 1. 
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,  restricts *  to belong to the 
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, or to be *= . This later case,  *= , occurs 
when k w F
HS    and no workers get fired
19.   
As exposed before, in the interval        * , workers get more education if:  
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 we can apply the intermediate theorem value looking for a value 
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 *  . Given that
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    F w w w w w
LS LS HS LS HS        ) 1 ( , the point * is unique. 
 
 
A.-2.- Proof of 
LS HS * w * w  . 
To show that 
LS HS * w * w  , first assume that both are equal. From [11] and [12] if 
w * w * w
LS HS    it must be accomplished that 
                                                 
18 If   k w F






 coincides with       * . 
19 From condition b  of lemma 1, the case  k w F
HS     can be excluded. 
20 To be accomplished      F w w w w w
LS LS HS LS HS        ) 1 (  it is required that 
HS w F  , but from condition b of lemma 1 this case is excluded.    
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Integrating by parts, 
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Substituting it in the preceding equation we get, 
 
    0       


       
k
F w
) ( B ) ( F k * E * E k ; so it’s false that  
LS HS * w * w   .   
So if any 
LS * w  is the competitive wage for “low educated”, for “high-educated” workers 





































HS HS ; 
 
it follows that if 
HS * w must be the wage of zero benefit, it must be higher than 
LS * w . In 
he same fashion it is easy to demonstrate that the ordering 
LS HS w w w * * *   is satisfied. 